Liberal Democrat

Liberal Democrat
Individual Freedom For Everyone

Tuesday, December 11, 2012

Salon: Michael Lind: 'Big Government Isn’t The Problem'

Source:Salon Magazine- for anyone whose new to America, who sees this image: left to right: U.S. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, U.S President Barack Obama & U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts.

"Has the United States mutated from democracy into kludgeocracy? The term “kludgeocracy” is a coinage by Steven M. Teles, a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University and a leading public intellectual in his own right. In a new paper commissioned by my colleagues and me at the New America Foundation, Teles argues that the complexity of American government is a greater long-run threat than its size.

“You can’t solve a problem until you can name it,” Teles argues.  The term “kludge” originated in computer programming, and means “an inelegant patch put in place to be backward compatible with the rest of a system. When you add up enough kludges, you get a very complicated program, one that is hard to understand and subject to crashes.” This sounds very much like American government -- thus “kludgeocracy.”

Teles finds kludgeocracy everywhere he looks. Sometimes it takes the form of multiple, overlapping or contradictory programs to promote a single objective. For example, to promote the objective of retirement security, Social Security, a simple and straightforward program, must now compete with “401(k)s, IRAs, 529 plans and the rest of our crazy quilt of savings incentives.”

In other cases kludgeocracy results when multiple governments have overlapping jurisdiction, spawning confusion while minimizing accountability. Teles points to scholarship arguing that confusion about which level of government was in charge of the levees contributed to the catastrophic system failure that occurred during Hurricane Katrina.

The costs of kludgeocracy are substantial, including redundancy and the need for oversight of easily gamed, complex programs, to say nothing of the occasional catastrophic crash. Why, then, is Congress so enamored of addressing problems through complex, indirect measures? It was said of Lyndon Johnson, as a strategist, that he thought that the straightest line between two points was a curve.  Congress, under either party, seems to think that the simplest answer to any solution must be a Rube Goldberg machine, in which a candle burns a rope that releases an ax that cuts a string that drops a stone into a catapult to propel a gerbil onto a treadmill (my own example, off the top of my head). 

Why does the American political system produce so much kludge? There are several reasons, according to Teles. One is the great number of pressure points in America’s system of divided powers and checks and balances, which allows special interests to extort complicating concessions at every stage of a bill’s passage into law. Lack of consensus on which policies should be federal and which should be local is another kludge-o-genic factor.

In my view, the most important is what Teles calls “the desire to preserve the fiction of small government while also addressing public problems.” The bizarrely inefficient structure of the American welfare state makes this clear.

Social Security and Medicare are by far the most successful and popular elements of the middle-class welfare state in the U.S. (the cost problems that plague Medicare afflict the U.S. medical sector as a whole, not just its public part). They are simple, easy to understand, user-friendly and cheap to administer.

They are also exceptions to the rule. Most other major federal welfare policies in the U.S. are either unwieldy programs with costs shared among states and the federal government, like Medicaid, or “hidden welfare state” policies like employer-based health insurance and the child tax credit, which, because they take the form of tax breaks, do not show up as on-budget federal spending.  A purely federal Medicaid program, with no role for the states at all, would be far more efficient, as a task force headed by Paul Volcker and Richard Ravich has recommended, and as Greg Anrig and others, including one President Ronald Reagan, have suggested. And direct spending on healthcare and child allowances would be cheaper than policies run through the IRS, which is not designed to administer a welfare state, hidden or not." 

But direct, public, non-kludgey programs would be attacked by conservatives and libertarians as “big government,” which will lead to serfdom, national bankruptcy, the end of Western civilization and other horrible things. And so reformers in the U.S. have learned to try to disguise what are in truth big government initiatives, by hiding them in the tax code, or by pressuring the states to share part of their costs.

Inasmuch as the incentives that work on our elected representatives favor kludgeocracy, Teles suggests that the incentives can be changed — for example, by congressional rules or even judicial rulings limiting the ability of Congress to carry out policy by means of federal grants to the states, rather than direct federal programs, for example.

Even so, our elected leaders may not do the right thing unless they are shamed into it. The message of 21st century civic reformers needs to be that government should do fewer things, in a more simple, straightforward and, if necessary, overtly expensive way, rather than doing too many things while hiding their true costs by means of the most insanely complicated Rube Goldberg devices that the imagination can devise. Here Teles sees a role for “public intellectuals, bloggers, researchers, and entrepreneurial politicians ... Only, in short, when Americans give a name to their pain -- kludgeocracy — are we likely to get a government that is simpler, more effective, and better for democracy.” 

Friday, December 7, 2012

The American Prospect: Steve Erickson: 'I Was a Teenage Conservative'

Source:American Prospect writer Steve Erickson.

"For a young Southern Californian coming of age in the early ’60s, the right with its emphasis on individual freedom was enormously appealing. What better way to rebel against liberal smugness? Then, the right betrayed itself. 

Barry Goldwater was my first political hero. The most antiauthoritarian figure in mainstream American politics, who said what he thought without giving a damn, he looked and sounded as Western as Arizona, the state he represented in the Senate. Goldwater and John Kennedy hatched plans in the White House-for what they assumed would be their upcoming presidential campaign against each other in 1964-to travel the country in the Arizonan's small plane that he flew himself, stopping off at airports in the middle of nowhere to debate one issue or another before taking off again. This two-fisted, free-flying persona made Goldwater the kind of politician that film director Howard Hawks might have come up with; by comparison, government couldn't help appearing soullessly oppressive. Great Society liberalism had become the norm by the mid-1960s, and this reinforced Goldwater's iconoclasm, striking a politically attuned, insistently nonconformist teenager as utopian, in the same way that Kennedy embodied idealism for so many others of my generation.

Utopia was in the air where I grew up, though I wouldn't have identified it as that any more than I could have told you who Howard Hawks was. L.A.'s San Fernando Valley was the no man's land between rural and suburban, between Wild West and space-age futurism. Ranches sprawled on the other side of the biggest road that ran near my house; three miles away, in the same part of the Valley that would become the porn capital of the world a couple of decades later, were makeshift frontier towns built for Westerns by the Hollywood studios. Overhead, the purple vapor trails of rocket tests streaked the skies. Kennedy's race to the moon built the modern Valley; every father of every kid I knew worked, as did my own dad, for the bursting aerospace industry--Lockheed, Hughes, North American, Rockwell. The progress that cut swaths through the Valley brought a disruption matched only by earthquakes. A new freeway (which eventually would be named after President Ronald Reagan) took our house, leaving just the swimming pool that was proof of my parents' upward mobility; the pool was given to the next-door neighbor whose house fell outside the freeway's path. This sort of upheaval was too common to be traumatizing. 

My mother loved Goldwater, too. She took me to a Goldwater rally at the Los Angeles Convention Center, and on the morning of the '64 election, I recall her peering through my bedroom door, gently trying to prepare her sensitive teenage son for the likelihood that our man Barry probably wasn't going to make it that day. An outspoken liberal in her youth, she was the more ideological of my parents, both of whom grew up Franklin Roosevelt Democrats. In the election of 1948, she missed being old enough to vote by 11 days; my father voted for Harry Truman. Though he remained a Democrat in name, he never voted Democratic again. In the next election, both my parents cast their ballots for the Republican nominee, Dwight Eisenhower, after which began the rightward political trajectory of so many New Deal children, which would accelerate in response to the tumult of the '60s. In my father's case, this evolution accompanied the economic ascension that went with swimming pools built and forsaken, while my mother shared with many Americans an alarm that Soviet communism was winning the Cold War, sabotaging democracy and free enterprise. My fascination with politics derived from an interest in the drama of American history; by the time I was 12, I was writing stories about Abraham Lincoln and Nathan Hale (an enthusiasm for patriots making the ultimate sacrifice may be discerned here). I could recite the Gettysburg Address and name all the presidents of the United States in order and the opponents they defeated. Enthralled by Thomas Jefferson's maxim that "government is best which governs least" (lately there's some question whether he said this), I believed that the Bill of Rights is the greatest political document ever written, and I still believe it today, even as I take greater note over the years that it was written less as an addendum to the Constitution than as a rebuttal, by the Constitution's greatest skeptic, its so-called father, James Madison.

Since the liberalism of the time was as smug as the conservatism of the future would be sanctimonious, I was secretly pleased when a history teacher in high school called my opinions "dangerous." What teenager doesn't want to be dangerous, especially when he's so undangerous in so many other ways? The conservatism I embraced was a whole greater than the sum of the parts, the emphasis on individual freedom trumping stuff that I considered to be fine print. While I never liked the sound of a welfare state, I was enough of a softy to have balked at denying help to people who needed it; to the extent that I understood it, the idea that arose from the Great Crash of 1929-that there should be a division between commercial banks and investment banks, without which the great crash of 2008 later became possible-sounded perfectly sensible and, if anything, like a conservative idea. I didn't really know what the Tennessee Valley Authority was or what it meant that Goldwater mused openly about selling it off. Goldwater mused openly about a lot of things that I took with a nuclear silo worth of salt. When he made jokes about lobbing missiles into the men's room in the Kremlin, I thought it was funny, something that now mortifies me; I was too immature to understand that a presidential campaign might be better off with a little less humor out of Dr. Strangelove, that election year's most talked-about film. I never believed that Goldwater was going to start a war, as suggested by an infamous Democratic television ad of a small girl plucking a daisy while counting down to Armageddon, because I didn't think he was crazy. I had more faith in his prudence than he gave anyone reason to have.

While my hero worship remained unabated, I was troubled that summer of '64. Liberals recoiled when Goldwater declared at the Republican Convention in San Francisco that "extremism in the pursuit of liberty is no vice," but I understood the statement on its face; Tom Paine and Patrick Henry, not to mention Jefferson, said the same thing, more or less. If I was barely savvy enough, however, to comprehend Goldwater's provocation, the mob fury that gripped the convention was harder to ignore. Rendered in images all the more unseemly by the crude black and white of television, the delegates cascaded verbal abuse at Goldwater's defeated rival for the nomination, New York's moderate governor, Nelson Rockefeller. More instinctually than I could articulate, I had the feeling maybe these were people I wouldn't want to be in the same room with. No ideology holds the patent on rage, and in the years to come, scenes as ugly were played out by the political left. But though I was still too young to fathom what was meant by the better angels of our nature, I did experience my first sense of political alienation, and it was from those who I thought were on my side.

Meanwhile, a month before the convention, on the momentum of Kennedy's martyrdom, the Senate passed the Civil Rights Act. This was the single most momentous piece of legislation since the same institution approved the 13th Amendment ending slavery a century before. Twenty-nine senators voted against the law; Goldwater was one of them. Following World War II, Goldwater had desegregated the Arizona National Guard that he founded and was a forceful proponent for integrating the nation's military forces as well. In the Senate he had supported every previous civil-rights bill, including the '64 bill in an earlier, less expansive form. I understood the constitutional rationale behind Goldwater's vote, which was that the government shouldn't have the power to dictate the conduct of a private business. Even at the age of 14, however, I had the unambiguous impression of some bigger picture being missed. While I didn't question Goldwater's motives, the motives on the convention floor that summer were transparent: There was little doubt that much of Goldwater's support was racist and that much of what was being expressed on the floor was white wrath. I'm keenly cognizant of how self-serving it is to overstate this now. I was a naïve white kid with half a century between then and this article to cover my tracks. So let's say that the rightness of the cause of racial justice was too manifest, too bright a line for one not to finally choose a side. In contrast with black people being hosed down on TV and beset by vicious dogs and vicious sticks swung by vicious cops, rhetoric about states' rights sounded hollow.

Politics is always personal. It would be disingenuous to suggest that the changes I was going through, especially at the ages of 18 and 19, were entirely philosophical. Suffice it to say that when I glanced back over my shoulder at my first 17 years, I didn't much like what I saw-someone rigid and judgmental, with politics to match. None of this examination took place inside the hermetic seal of my own thinking and feeling; a cultural explosion rocked the decade around me. The facts of the civil-rights movement became as inexorable to me as worries about democracy and totalitarianism. The national dilemma of race, and that dilemma's resolution, became crucial to my evolving patriotism; not having had a single acquaintance before college who was African American, now I was living with African Americans in the college dormitory. Jeffersonian individualism remained my ideal, but there were more and more examples of how sometimes only the dreaded federal government had the power to protect the freedom of the individual from states and localities. Over and over, the notion that government necessarily becomes more responsive and better suited to protecting liberty the farther down the line from federalism it gets was proved irrefutably false.

By the end of the '60s, it was clear that the conservatism I so ardently adopted was wrong about the two great issues of the day, civil rights being the first. 

The other was a war in Southeast Asia that no military or political figure was capable of explaining, a war for which every guy I knew was fodder. One night in 1969, three weeks before Christmas, a great raffle was held in Washington, D.C., in which my fate was drawn from a glass jar. All men of draft age received a number that would determine how soon, if ever, they would be called up for service and combat. Mine was 345, a very good number as numbers went in a situation that nonetheless underscored the absurdity of the lottery and the war itself. The proposition of bolstering an inept and crooked Indochinese country for the sake of American national security was one that few in the country accepted any longer, and when four students were murdered by the National Guard on a campus in Ohio the following spring during a demonstration against the war, what died as well was the last semblance of support for the war and an ideology that justified it. To a Jeffersonian, the brandishing of state power in order to conscript people to fight in a faithless conflagration and then to oppress the right of assembly stipulated by the First Amendment was repellent.

The 1960s were a Rorschach decade. No interpretation of the era's inkblot is altogether wrong. Conservatism and liberalism were realigned in the process, creeds reassessed; liberal Democrats first escalated the Vietnam War, while some conservatives suggested that if this was an endeavor we couldn't win, we should withdraw. But while the likes of Goldwater raised ever more blunt questions about the war and the draft, the vast majority of self-identified conservatives supported the state. Up to a point, this was an understandable response to what many ordinary Americans perceived as growing turmoil; faced with chaos, people like my parents had different ideas than I of what was to be conserved. None of this, however, changed the fact that in its deceit about the war's unfolding and what was and wasn't at stake, the state itself bore accountability for much of this chaos, and in the conflict between freedom and order, while the Jeffersonian conservatism that I signed up for gave the benefit of the doubt to freedom, a new conservatism now chose order. This state-imposed order was manifested by duplicity in the form of government misinformation and intimidation and surveillance, as well as by an implicit lack of faith in America itself-in an American's right to know, in the American fabric's ability to weather such fraying of and even rips in the national life. "If it takes a bloodbath," Reagan said upon quelling a demonstration at the University of California, Berkeley, during his first term as California's governor, "let's get it over with," a battle cry that not long before would have confirmed everything about the state that conservatives feared.

Ronald Reagan was the conservative Jesus for whom Goldwater proved to be only John the Baptist. Reagan came to the attention of conservatives when he made a speech for Goldwater a week before the '64 election, advancing the case for Goldwater's candidacy more powerfully than Goldwater had. Over the next 16 years, Reagan became the personification of a hybrid conservatism forged by times that tested everything. This fusion crossed an eloquence on behalf of liberty with a new trust in the power of the state; deserting the ideal of individual freedom, now conservatives automatically registered protest against the war and on behalf of civil rights as leftist insurrection. While Reagan's election as president in 1980 appeared to be the apotheosis of what Goldwater started, in fact conservatism and the new president each were remaking themselves in the image of the other. Under Reagan the national debt and size of the federal government exploded; the Justice Department paid a purposely ominous attention to what adults read and watched; the war on drugs grew more ruthless; cynicism about science, particularly as it had to do with the environment, grew more pronounced; antagonism to the freedom of women to make choices about their bodies grew more vehement.

Most striking, three impulses distinguished the new right. The first was how the right's enmity toward centralized state power was matched by an adoration of centralized corporate power. This constituted an abandonment of the principle of a truly free marketplace-with entrepreneurship and the flourishing of small business becoming more constrained and difficult--

and the overarching principle of decentralization. The second impulse was the displacement of liberty as conservatism's core priority by a new priority, "values," by which the right invariably meant sexual behavior, predominantly the sexual behavior of women and homosexuals. The third new impulse was most profound. This was a reconceptualization of the republic as one in which citizens are bound not by a Constitution in which God isn't once mentioned, euphemized, or alluded to but by an unwritten Christian covenant that implicitly subjects free will to an organizing ethos that's unmistakably theocratic. What was a freedom movement became an authority/wealth/religious movement. The new conservatism now spoke of the Bill of Rights with thinly veiled contempt. Conservatism continued to pay lip service to freedom in the abstract even as the only freedoms in the specific that it defended with urgency were the right to make a profit and to own a gun. If the language of conservatism, as given voice by President Reagan, hadn't changed, its very essence had transformed, within two decades of Goldwater's defeated run for the presidency.

In college I had doubts about everything, and then doubts about the doubts. I didn't become a leftist: I wouldn't have contemplated for two seconds putting a poster of Mao on my wall any more than I would have put up one of Hitler, and I found a lot of the revolutionary sentiments in pop music that I otherwise loved simplistic or silly. Calling the United States "fascist" was outrageous and reckless, a neutering of the word's power by its careless use. I believed the testimony of history was that a managed capitalism made more people free and happy than did communism.

Some of the left-wing ideologues I knew reminded me of the right-wing ideologues I knew, including the one I had known best: me. The extent to which ideology hijacks independent thought, refracting an issue through the lens of an already-settled bias, was all the more disturbing for how long it took me to see it. Ideology is pathological: It provides a psychological structure posing as a theoretical one. This is why fervent communist intellectuals of the 1930s could become fervent anti-communist intellectuals of the 1950s-they didn't change at all. They became anti-communist communists. In our own day, Keith Olbermann is a left-wing version of Glenn Beck and vice versa; you can switch their soundtracks and notice no difference in body nuance or facial expression or voice inflection, because the inner emotional wiring is the same. The harder a line that ideology hews, the more that right and left have in common, sharing a penchant for rewriting the past to vindicate whatever version of the present each prefers to trust. Stalinists flatly deny that the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 ever happened, in the same way that leaders of the contemporary right recast American history in terms of a mind-set that regards information as an elite conspiracy, science as a plot against God, and the earth as a subversive entity.

Where this story leaves me at the end isn't really important, but since it began as my story, I should finish it. I'm keenly aware that my present identity as a political nomad may be no less about my ego than knee-jerk obstinacy was in my adolescence, that perhaps I repeat the pattern of my youth in reflexively staking out the vantage point of a contrarian. My politics were right when the country was left, and then moved left as the country moved right. The most flattering conclusion is that my previous life as a teenage right-winger inoculates me to ideology altogether. Consistency isn't always the hobgoblin of a small mind: Every amendment in the Bill of Rights can't be interpreted so broadly as to extrapolate from the fourth not simply a right to privacy but to an abortion, while at the same time the Second Amendment is strictly construed as being about a militia rather than the larger freedom of the citizenry not to be disarmed by the state. In turn, the Second Amendment can't be interpreted broadly, ignoring the actual language, while the other nine are interpreted narrowly. At a social gathering following 9/11, I was dismayed that friends to the left of me condemned what I considered George W. Bush's legitimate military action in Afghanistan, given the complicity of the Taliban in its alliance with al-Qaeda; the war against Iraq, on the other hand (having nothing to do with al-Qaeda or 9/11 or phantom weapons), made me angrier than anything that any American government has done.

I have my own kids now. Despite gratifying evidence that my 15-year-old son knows who the Koch brothers are, the allure of memorizing all the presidents in order escapes him. My seven-year-old, on the other hand, was reported by neighbors to be heard railing at her playmates, "And don't even get me started on Paul Ryan!" I honestly believe my children are best served by a free politics that needs two wings to stay airborne and a push-me/pull-you tension between what is a right and what is a privilege, what is entitled and what is not, what reasonably progresses and what responsibly conserves. As recently as five years ago, I voted for a Republican for statewide office, and 12 years ago in the California primary, I voted for a Republican for president. I'm sorry to say that I don't foresee doing it again. While the man in the middle clings to the vanity of fair-mindedness, contending that both sides are equally right and wrong, perfectly balanced by perspectives that are equally valid and flawed, conservatism has too irrevocably exhausted not just its philosophical credibility but any moral mandate. Run amok, the authoritarian, corporate, and theocratic impulses that were troubling a quarter-century ago have become appalling and indisputable.

Caught between know-nothingism and a faux populism that disguises a predisposition to favor the financially powerful against the disenfranchised, the new right is born of that awful howl that rose from the convention floor in San Francisco and so startled me. This is the ferocity that animates the right's most prominent spokesmen in politics and electronic discourse.

Some will argue it's gratuitous to characterize a movement in terms of its gratuitousness-debate audiences cheering executions and booing gay soldiers in Iraq. I don't think so anymore. 

At its most unforgiving, the incontrovertible id of today's conservatism insists that an American president is not really an American and not really the president and tries to reject not solely his ideas but also the very fact of him. Over the past four years, the right, exuding bad faith at best and collective psychosis at worst, has intended not merely to end a presidency but to discredit its existence. Even before conservatism betrayed itself so conspicuously I'm not sure my right-wing teenage self thought conservatism was about shipping 12 million Latinos out of the country or supposing that people stupid enough to get sick when they can't afford it should die. Pressed on the point, I should like to think that I would have allowed that being a country involves the sustenance of a social contract and the recognition that we're more than 300 million free agents who happen to be roaming the same piece of real estate.

As for Barry Goldwater, before his death he became an exile from the movement that once was his. Following his presidential run, he continued to strike positions in accordance with a Jeffersonian big-individual/-small-government code. He called for an end to the draft. He became an ardent environmentalist. He supported the Voting Rights Act. He promoted legalization of marijuana. He championed gay rights. He espoused abortion rights. He engineered President Richard Nixon's resignation for having used the levers of power to harass innocent Americans. He advocated (well, mused openly about, as was his wont) the nomination of black Democratic Congresswoman Barbara Jordan for vice president in 1976. He lobbied for the Supreme Court's first female justice. He blasted Reagan for the 1987 Iran-Contra scandal ("the goddamned stupidest foreign-policy blunder this country's ever made"). He admonished George H.W. Bush for running a shallow campaign against Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis in 1988. He endorsed Democratic congressional candidates in the early '90s. He defended President Bill Clinton from trumped-up Republican charges of corruption. His denunciations of the religious right grew more bitter ("Do not associate my name with anything you do-you're extremists, and you've hurt the Republican Party much more than the Democrats have"), and his consternation grew at how the rest of the party became caught in the undertow: "A lot of so-called conservatives today don't know what the word means," he told the Chicago Tribune in 1994. When Republican nominee Robert Dole went to get Goldwater's benediction during the 1996 campaign, hoping to shore up his conservative credentials while the news cameras rolled, Goldwater could be seen and heard by millions telling Dole, somewhat wryly, "We're the new liberals of the party. Can you imagine that?"-not what Dole had in mind. By the time he died in 1998, Republicans had begun a whispering campaign that Goldwater suffered from dementia. Speaking for the Arizona delegation at the Democratic Convention this past summer, Goldwater's granddaughter cast her state's votes for Barack Obama. 

Thursday, December 6, 2012

The Nation: L.R. Runner: 'How to Save the Democratic Party'

Source:The Nation with a look at the U.S. Congress.

"The time has come for a showdown between the reformist and accommodationist wings of the party. 

The article below is not a Nation editorial or a solicited piece but a manifesto we received from an occasional contributor. We are publishing it in the hope of stirring discussion of one of the most important political issues of our time: how to transform what the author, who uses a pseudonym to avoid personalizing that issue, calls the “bipartisan” Democratic Party into an organization capable of bringing about desperately needed progressive change in America. You can read responses, including those from Keith Ellison, Dorian T. Warren, Benjamin Todd Jealous, and more, here. —The Editors
 
American progressives and principled liberals need to face an essential truth: the Democratic Party, as now constituted, is no longer an agency for realizing their ideals.
  
Consider the larger implications of the November 6 elections, which took place in economic and social conditions that should have produced landslide victories for even a moderately populist party. In the two most representative elections—the direct popular vote for the presidency and the House of Representatives—the Democratic Party won the former by less than 4 percent and lost the latter, as it did in 2010, to the most reactionary Republican Party in modern times.

The problem is not President Obama or any other individual leader but the Democratic Party itself. Much of its establishment, from Washington to most of the state capitals, has long since become a party of “bipartisan compromise” with an increasingly right-wing Republicanism, particularly on economic issues with great social consequences—as though America’s true course now lies midway between abolishing the achievements of the New Deal and Great Society and extending them fully in our times. Too many members of the party’s nationwide hierarchy are closer, ideologically and politically, to Wall Street than to Main Street—to the corporate, rich and powerful than to the stricken middle class, the increasingly impoverished working class (and the diminished and embattled unions that protect it), and the unemployed and perpetually poor. 

If more proof is needed, the Democratic Party has shown itself to be incapable of providing the moral imperatives, policy ideas, broad popular support or elected officials necessary to lead the nation out of its worst economic and social calamity in eighty years, now in its fifth year of millions of wrecked lives. Indeed, the party’s complicity in the crisis is only somewhat less than that of Republicans unconditionally devoted to only one human right: the unrestrained accumulation of corporate and private wealth. 

A new party—not a third party, but a real second party representing authentic alternatives, as befits a democracy—is therefore urgently needed. Fortunately, the nucleus of such a party already exists, however captive-like and timid, inside today’s Democratic Party. (The late Senator Paul Wellstone called it “the democratic wing of the Democratic Party.”) For this nucleus to grow, come to power and lead a new reformation of American capitalism, it must liberate itself by occupying and transforming the Democratic Party, as insurgents have done in other co-opted parties that outlived their historical mission—even if this means bipartisan Democrats leaving to become Republicans or go into the third-party wilderness.

* * *

The political bankruptcy of the Democratic Party, its historic achievements consigned to the distant past, is not a recent development. The party’s role in the making of the current crisis speaks for itself. For forty years—that is, under both Republican and Democratic presidents and Congresses—the nation’s wealth has been put into fewer and fewer hands (the richest 1 percent now possess more wealth than the less prosperous 90 percent), while ever more people have been relegated to poverty or rendered unable to maintain their hard-earned place in the middle class.

Hence today’s shameful American realities (and new exceptionalism): rates of family income inequality, child poverty, infant mortality and incarceration that are greater—and opportunities for quality education and upward social mobility that are less—than in almost any other modern democracy. The two defining tenets of the American dream are being lost, if they have not been lost already: that most children have a fair chance of achieving more than their parents did; and that determination and hard work will assure a successful and secure life.

Democratic loyalists blame Republicans for this national tragedy without acknowledging their own party’s responsibility. The policies that led to today’s crisis gained force with the Reagan administration, but crucial ones were incorporated into President Clinton’s centrist “third way” in the 1990s, a fateful revision of the Democratic mission adumbrated earlier by President Carter. Those degraded Democratic policies included reducing regulations on financial institutions; lowering taxes on corporations, investors and the wealthy; enacting “free trade” measures at the cost of American jobs; and fetishizing “fiscal responsibility” and balanced federal budgets (as though the US government is merely a big family household) to the detriment of social justice and investment in the nation’s infrastructure.

Thus did the Clinton administration—in keeping with its casual epitaph for the New Deal, “The era of big government is over”—contribute to today’s austerity-promoting, deficit-cutting consensus that gives priority to the concerns of investors over the needs of most Americans. Indeed, President Clinton and congressional Democrats made a special contribution to the “deficit crisis” by squandering the historic opportunity for a post–cold war demilitarization of US national security policy—first by expanding NATO toward Russia and then by bombing Serbia, a precedent for the costly bipartisan wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed.

* * *

The Democratic Party has been equally bipartisan—or accommodationist—since the economic crisis began in 2008. Consider the record:

§ It was not a transformed party that elected Barack Obama in 2008, but one that benefited from an extraordinary combination of millions of lost jobs and homes, a unique candidate and a weak Republican ticket. Indeed, during its eight years out of presidential power, the Democratic Party, laden with its own oligarchic funding and intimate Wall Street ties, had recruited so few new policy advocates that its young president surrounded himself with the same Clinton advisers who had contributed to the financial collapse at home and militarized policies abroad.

§ Neither those political retreads nor the larger Democratic hierarchy encouraged any populist or radical reform sentiments that Obama may have had, instead only reinforcing his penchant for “bipartisan compromise.” Whatever Obama’s achievements, they were offset by the lost opportunities: the bailout of Wall Street without holding its oligarchic banks and other economic predators responsible for the financial collapse—93 percent of income gains in 2009–10 benefited the top 1 percent of taxpayers—and without extending comparable assistance to millions of stricken homeowners (even leaving unused $300 billion allocated for that purpose); the failure to spend what was required to stimulate enough new jobs; healthcare legislation considerably less than the nation needed; and the decision to escalate the unwinnable US-led war in Afghanistan, the longest in American history.

§ More generally, instead of acting on popular expectations aroused by Obama’s election—perhaps even frightened by them—the Democratic establishment, especially in Congress, tried to occupy the political center, moving that accommodationist space further to the right than it had been in decades. As economic and social hardships grew across the country, powerful Democrats shunned—still in the name of “fiscal responsibility” and “investors”—almost everything populist in the party’s traditions, even abdicating the word “reform” to reactionary Republicans and virtually deleting nearly 50 million poor Americans from the bipartisan narrative of the crisis. (Like President Obama, his party establishment changed course, or at least its rhetoric, only in late 2011 and early 2012, when this seemed the only chance for electoral survival in November.)

§ Having unilaterally disarmed ideologically, and having failed to diminish either widespread deprivation or corporate power in America, the Democratic Party then squandered a textbook electoral opportunity. In 2010, when economic and social conditions also should have resulted in overwhelming Democratic victories, the party lost—to a Hoover-like Republican Party—control of the House and its effective majority in the Senate, even including the late Edward Kennedy’s iconic seat in Massachusetts. Tens of millions of Americans are still paying the price for that epic failure.

§ Both Obama and Congressional Democrats reacted to the 2010 electoral defeat not with a renewed commitment to the party’s populist traditions but with more capitulation, redoubling their pursuit of “bipartisan compromise”—including a “grand bargain”—from a position now of legislative weakness. Compromise meant yielding on one New Deal and Great Society principle after another, from progressive taxation, financial regulation, the minimum wage and jobs to the environment and entitlements, stopping only barely short of Medicare. In the process, mainstream Democrats acted like the “moderate Republicans” they had long since become and replaced.

§ In 2011, nonpoliticians gave the Democratic Party yet another chance, as the Occupy Wall Street movement spread across the nation. The Republican Party had eagerly gained energy and confidence from the Tea Party in 2009–10, but the Democratic establishment remained aloof from the more popular Occupy movement. Thus should have ended any lingering illusions that the Democratic hierarchy represents a party of the people, much less “the 99 percent.” Little wonder that voters gave neither party a commanding victory on November 6.

* * *

If the existing Democratic Party could not respond adequately to the nation’s most destructive economic and social crisis since the Great Depression, there is no reason to believe it can any longer produce alternatives to the decades of plutocratic policy-making that led to the calamity. This truth is illustrated by the two prevailing explanations of the party’s failures put forth by its own current and former adherents.

One explanation continues to blame only the Republicans, who are said to have “duped” Americans into voting against their own interests. With implied contempt for allegedly gullible voters, these Democratic apologists are in effect acknowledging the inability of many of their candidates to campaign persuasively. But how hard can it be, if Democrats really believe in the principles at stake, to explain compellingly what “less government”—budget cuts (federal, state and local), unregulated banks, and low taxes on high profits and income—would mean for most voters and their families, from education, jobs, retirement and healthcare to public security, transportation and the environment? Considering that nearly half of American households receive direct government benefits, and that virtually every American has benefited from government social policies, it’s hard only if Democrats do not really believe in these issues, as many apparently do not.

The other explanation insists that the Democratic Party has not capitulated enough. An influential group of disaffected Democrats, led by financial titans, highly placed columnists and other privileged insiders, has been clamoring for an avowedly “centrist” party based on still more “bipartisan compromise,” as though Democrats have been lacking in that regard. If the project, essentially a version of the “grand bargain,” succeeds in swaying the Democratic establishment (which may be its actual purpose), the result would be a democracy without any alternatives to government of, by and for the 1 percent—that is, no democracy at all.

The nation needs something fundamentally different. It needs an unapologetically partisan Democratic Party committed to adapting the populist, progressive and liberal principles of the New Deal and Great Society—simply put, modernizing economic development and growth, full employment, shared prosperity and social justice—to present-day America.

Many of today’s progressives look instead to grassroots movements. Such movements are important—they can inspire, prod and replenish the party, as some are now trying to do—but they cannot play the necessary role. In a country as vast and diverse as the United States, and in the American political system, only a nationwide party—again, not an ineffectual third party but an effective second one—can mobilize the support to elect a president and a Congress needed for transformational change. And then, crucially, because a party gets the officials it deserves, that victorious party must guard against unprincipled compromises by the president and other representatives it has elected. (For example, during and after the 2012 campaign, President Obama has promised a renewed effort to achieve a previously elusive compromise in the spirit of a “grand bargain,” which will almost certainly reduce spending on the nation’s vital human and structural needs.) 

Equally important, only such a renewed Democratic Party can transform the pyramid of conformist elites—educational, media, political and business—that underpins bipartisan consensus at the top. Such a party will do what today’s Democratic establishment no longer does: 

§ Open its policy ranks to progressive thinkers and ideas marginalized by the status quo centrism of even purportedly liberal universities, think tanks and media; 

§ Embrace nonconformist candidates and reform activists in state and local politics; 

§ Support and give a larger party role to trade unions and other rank-and-file movements across the country to ensure that the party’s populism is not just for but of the people; and 

§ Make common cause with the like-minded small parties that exist, sometimes on the ballot, in many states. 

A transformed Democratic Party brimming with such purpose, ideas and candidates can win the votes of millions of people alienated by both parties. Indeed, polls suggest that many of those voters (and nonvoters) are ready for such a party.

In short, the time has come for a showdown—if necessary, even a parting of ways—between the reformist and accommodationist wings of the Democratic Party. This should be done democratically, with an open discussion of the fundamental issues, and every party official and member given a chance to choose. The initiative could come from below, from local officials and rank-and-file Democrats, or from above, from the party’s democratic wing in Congress—or even from President Obama himself in his second term, in order to realize his original promise.

Given the national crisis still savaging American lives, and calling upon their best traditions, rededicated Democrats have every chance of winning this historic struggle for the soul and future of their party. Indeed, they begin from a position of strength: the Progressive Caucus is the largest Democratic group in the current Congress. And it will be supplemented in the next one by the contingent of new progressives elected in November.

* * *

The reckoning must be carried out based on six fundamental principles that will guide the campaigning and policy-making of a renewed Democratic Party. All of them once inspired a great democratic reformation, and they can do so again if adapted to our present needs.

1. The overriding purpose of government of, by and for the people is to assure all citizens not an equal but a fair opportunity (since there is no equality of birth, circumstances or ability) to realize their hopes and potential. This means a fair opportunity to acquire a good education, achieve a vocation and commensurate prosperity, raise a family in decent housing, and experience life in the best possible health. Whenever and wherever the private sector does not provide these basic human rights, a truly representative democratic government must do so. The goal, in short, is not “big government” or “less government,” but government adequate to meet these obligations.

2. The principle of fairness applies particularly to the economy, which underlies so many other rights. A democratic capitalist economy should exist for the people, not the people for financial and other predatory institutions. Equally true, the vaunted “free market” scarcely exists in the modern world—and where it does, it usually results in corruption and excessively concentrated power. Democracy requires instead a fair market for all its economic participants: individuals; small, medium and large businesses; and labor. This too can be assured only by representative government, through direct and indirect regulations.

3. A government committed to social and economic fairness requires tax revenue for this purpose. The rich, the less affluent and the poor all benefit from government expenditures. (They use the same roads, drink the same water, breathe the same air and require the same public security.) Indeed, some government provisions benefit the well-off disproportionately, as with air-travel safety and high-speed trains. Taxation is therefore not merely a fiscal category but an expression of social fairness, which means it must be progressive and without the devices that enable the wealthy to pay at lower rates than their servants, and employers than their employees.

4. All of these fairness provisions require government regulations, agencies and administrative procedures. At the same time, the transformed Democratic Party understands that some of its past programs may have bequeathed a bureaucracy that has outlived its utility and even become an obstacle to free, fair pursuits. The party therefore also resolves to establish a professional review of all such agencies and procedures and to abolish or revise those that no longer serve a public good.

5. No American reformation, or general well-being, is possible—politically or financially—without the demilitarization of foreign and national security policy. Policies that rely increasingly on swollen military budgets, troop deployments, NATO warplanes, drones and large nuclear stockpiles, often animated by unworthy imperial motives, have squandered American lives, wealth and good will abroad—with few, if any, real gains in national security. We need a new conception of national security—one maximizing diplomatic rather than military approaches—that corresponds to our new times, real needs and American values.

6. The transformed Democratic Party also understands that none of these principles or reforms will be possible without radically reducing the growing role of corporate and private wealth in American elections, in which the party has also been deeply complicit. Billions of dollars have profoundly undermined the first principle of democratic government of, by and for the people, and this is where equality is both possible and necessary. Real democracy requires elections with a maximum of voters and a minimum of influence-seeking money. Therefore, the party resolves to pursue every means to restore the essential practice of elections uncorrupted by financial power and of policy-making independent of paid lobbyists.

* * *

Many Democrats who share these principles may say that it is politically dangerous or impossible to re-create the party by drawing such divisive lines within it. Let them consider the damage already done to America, and to the Democratic Party itself, by a party that can no longer repair the nation. Let them consider the instances in history when principled insurgents recast their parties and led them to great achievements. Let them even remember how today’s right-wing Republicans fought, unwavering in their principles, to occupy and control their party.

Or let them simply heed the timeless imperative of historic change: “If not now, when? If not us, who?” 

CBPP: Michael Leachman: 'Fact Sheet: Reducing Federal Deficits Without a Significant Revenue Increase Would Shift Substantial Costs to States'


Source:Center For Budget & Policy Priorities- with a look at the Federal deficit.

"If it fails to include significant new revenues, a major legislative package to shrink federal deficits would almost certainly make substantial cuts in federal funds that support states and localities.  These cuts likely would force states and localities to reduce the quality and reach of their basic public systems — schools, clean water facilities, and law enforcement activities, for example — or to raise new revenue or cut other programs to continue meeting these needs.  Either way, the result would be a large cost shift from the federal government to states and localities.  By contrast, if Congress adopts a balanced deficit-reduction plan that includes significant new revenues, the resulting cost shift to states and localities almost certainly will be smaller.

States Provide Services That Are National Priorities
States and localities provide public services that address national priorities.  For example, they educate the nation’s children and build and repair the nation’s roads, bridges, airports, and public transit systems.  They also undertake a wide range of other important functions, including protecting waterways from sewage contamination, protecting public safety, reducing homelessness, revitalizing run-down neighborhoods, providing technical job skills training to community college students and others, and responding after disasters.  Some 87 percent of the nation’s public employees — teachers, police officers, child abuse case workers, road construction engineers, and many others — work for state or local governments.

States, Weakened by the Recession, Cannot Absorb Large New Cost Shifts
State revenues for these services were deeply damaged by the recent recession, the worst for state finances in 70 years.  Since the recession hit, states have closed budget shortfalls totaling well over half a trillion dollars.  In the last four years, states and localities have shed more than 600,000 jobs.  While state revenues are beginning to recover, they remain about 6 percent below pre-recession levels after adjusting for inflation.  It will be several years more before states recover fully.

With their own budgets so seriously damaged, states cannot absorb massive new cost shifts from the federal government.  Significant federal funding cuts would force states to lay off still more people and to cut spending for schools, roads, or other public services in others ways or else raise substantial new revenue in-state to continue addressing these needs.  Either way, the result would be a large cost shift from the federal government to states and localities, a cost shift that would hit states hard at a time when their budgets already are deeply wounded.

Federal Deficit Reduction That Does Not Include Significant Revenue Likely Would Shift Substantial Costs to States
Many federal policy makers agree in broad terms that, as they seek to reduce the deficit, cuts in Social Security and Medicare that affect current beneficiaries should be limited and defense spending should not be cut much, if at all, below the spending caps imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act.  If the savings from Social Security, Medicare, and defense — which together account for well over half of non-interest federal spending — are limited and the deficit plan does not include significant revenues, federal support for programs operated by state and local governments will stand out as one of the few remaining sources of large potential savings.

That’s because a large part of the federal budget outside of Social Security, Medicare, defense, and interest payments on the national debt — 41 percent of what’s left — consists of grants to states and localities.  Hence, if significant new revenue isn’t included, a major legislative package to shrink federal deficits almost certainly will cut deeply into state and local aid, shifting to the states more of the costs for educating children and providing other public services." 

From CBPP

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Salon: David Woolner: 'President Obama Needs to Channel FDR On The Fiscal Cliff'

Source:Salon Magazine- President Barack H. Obama (Democrat, Illinois) 44th President of the United States.

"The president should use this crisis to tackle the inequality that's undermining our democracy. 

It has been well said that "the freest government, if it could exist, would not be long acceptable, if the tendency of the laws were to create a rapid accumulation of property in few hands, and to render the great mass of the population dependent and penniless…"

We believe in a way of living in which political democracy and free private enterprise for profit should serve and protect each other—to ensure a maximum of human liberty not for a few but for all…

Today many Americans ask the uneasy question: Is the vociferation that our liberties are in danger justified by the facts?

...Their answer is that if there is that danger it comes from that concentrated private economic power which is struggling so hard to master our democratic government.—Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938. 

In his remarks on the so-called “fiscal cliff,” and in numerous campaign speeches, President Obama has repeatedly remarked that “we can’t just cut our way to prosperity,” and that “if we’re serious about reducing the deficit, we have to combine spending cuts with revenue. And that means asking the wealthiest Americans to pay a little more in taxes.” The president has also said that he is “not wedded to every detail” of his current plan to reduce the deficit and that he is open to compromise. But he also has made it plain, as he did in his recent remarks at the White House, that he will refuse to accept any approach that isn’t balanced; that he is “not going to ask students and seniors and middle-class families to pay down the entire deficit while people like me making over $250,000 aren’t asked to pay a dime more in taxes.”

For the millions of Americans who remain out of work, or are struggling with hourly wages that when adjusted for inflation stand where they were in 1978, this is welcome news. But the president’s focus on taxes and the deficit is only part of the story. What the country really needs, according to most economists, is more stimulus, for the best way to reduce the deficit is to expand the economy, which would of course result in more government revenue.

The president has certainly made reference to this, and he has included a modest $50 billion in stimulus spending in his recent budget proposal to Congress, but for the most part the public discourse on how to avoid the “fiscal cliff” and fix our economy has been centered not on jobs or the vast structural inequality that now separates the top 1-2 percent from the rest of us, but on the deficit. This is unfortunate, for it means, in essence, that the country’s economic agenda is still very much in the hands of the conservative right; that we are still focused not on the cause of our economic woes—a collapsed economy brought on by the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression—but on the by-product: the vast fall-off in federal, state, and local revenue that naturally came about as a result of this collapse.

A far better exercise would be to move away from the right’s obsession with the deficit and open up a conversation with the American people about a far more critical issue facing the nation: the ever-widening gulf between the rich and the rest of us and the very real consequences that this disparity in income has had on our economy and indeed on the very nature of our democracy.

Roughly three-quarters of a century ago, when faced with a similar set of circumstances—including a conservative right that was fond of labeling his policies socialist—Franklin Roosevelt did not shy away from addressing the conditions that led to the collapse of the world’s economy. He well understood—as did the millions of Americans who lived in or on the threshold of poverty—that “the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself.” He also understood that “the Federal debt, whether it be twenty-five billions or forty billions, can only be paid if the Nation obtains a vastly increased citizen income…The higher the national income goes the faster will we be able to reduce the total of Federal and state and local debts. Viewed from every angle, today's purchasing power—the citizens' income of today—is not at this time sufficient to drive the economic system of America at higher speed.”

Taking note of this—and in a reference to the bottom half of the U.S. population that today sounds all too familiar—FDR observed in a speech on the perils of monopoly that:

47 per cent of all American families and single individuals living alone had incomes of less than $1,000 for the year; and at the other end of the ladder a little less than 1 1/2 per cent of the nation's families received incomes which in dollars and cents reached the same total as the incomes of the 47 per cent at the bottom…

This clearly was unacceptable, he went on, for:

No people, least of all a democratic people, will be content to go without work or to accept some standard of living which obviously and woefully falls short of their capacity to produce. No people, least of all a people with our traditions of personal liberty, will endure the slow erosion of opportunity for the common man, the oppressive sense of helplessness under the domination of a few, which are overshadowing our whole economic life.

Hence, for Roosevelt it was economic plight of the average American—not the deficit—that was the key not only to the restoration of our economy, but also to the health and well-being of our democratic system of government; even to our very way of life.

The debate over the so-called fiscal cliff and the showdown between President Obama and Congress over what to do about it has attracted a great deal of attention from the media. But rather than fall into another round of endless bickering with the budget hawks about the deficit, the president should use this opportunity to remind the American people—as FDR did all those years ago—that an economy and a political system built on fundamental inequality is simply not sustainable. If we really want to help the 47 percent our highest priority should be to adopt policies based on the fundamental idea that “political democracy and free private enterprise for profit should serve and protect each other,” not just the wealthy few at the top."

Monday, December 3, 2012

The American Prospect: Robert Kuttner: 'Greedy Geezers, Reconsidered'

Source:The American Prospect- Holy smokes, Batman! That greedy geezer can afford to smoke cigars. Maybe we should cut his Social Security. After all, it's the government's money anyway. LOL

"In the current downturn, the vast majority of the elderly are suffering along with the young. The right cure would help both generations.

For three decades, conservative critics have been warning that the elderly are living too well at the expense of the young. Since the early 1980s, financier Peter G. Peterson has been predicting that Social Security's excessive generosity would crash the retirement system and the economy. The late British journalist Henry Fairlie, in 1988, famously wrote a piece in The New Republic with the cover line "Greedy Geezers," faulting the elderly for living too well at the expense of the young. 

However, the Bush tax cuts, the costs of two wars, an inefficient privatized Medicare drug plan, and the financial collapse of 2008 drove the budget back into deep deficit and gave new life to the Social Security Cassandras. Unemployment soared, payroll taxes plummeted, and a deep economic slump followed. Now, Social Security is once again projected to lack the funds to pay out all of its claims, as early as 2033.

Apart from the cause and cure of Social Security's projected deficit, there was always one fallacy at the core of the greedy-geezers fable: The vast majority of the elderly are far from wealthy. The median income of elderly Americans in 2010 was just $25,704 for males and $15,072 for females. Almost two-thirds of the elderly depend on Social Security for at least 70 percent of their entire income. The income of the very wealthy elderly is outsize, but that's hardly a reason for cutting Social Security for everyone else. Peterson contends that "a substantial part of these [Social Security] retirement payments go to people like me"-affluent folks who can do without the money. But according to Michael Hiltzik, a business columnist for the Los Angeles Times, the $1.14 billion in Social Security payments that went to recipients earning $1 million or more in 2009 amounted to less than one-fifth of 1 percent of all benefits paid. If we want government to recapture that money, it's far better to use the progressive income tax than to cut Social Security benefits across the board. 

A huge part of the austerity crusade has been based on moral claims of generational justice. Supposedly, Social Security and Medicare are contributing to the massive public debt that older boomers and retired people are selfishly passing along to their children and grandchildren. As these obligations come due and payable, interest rates and taxes will rise, and future generations will suffer reduced living standards because of our own profligacy and short-sightedness. This story has become a staple of both conservative and centrist political rhetoric. It was the centerpiece of the Bowles-Simpson Commission that President Barack Obama appointed in 2010 to devise a deficit-reduction plan. In The New York Times, moderate liberal columnist Thomas Friedman parrots it, as does conservative David Brooks. The Washington Post editorial page as well as Post financial writers like Lori Montgomery and even the usually liberal Steven Pearlstein take it as gospel. As former Republican Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire warned, if the debt is not reduced, "our children will have less of a quality of life than we've had. … They will have a government they can't afford … and we will be demanding so much of them in the area of taxes that they will not have the money to send their kids to college or buy that home or just live a good quality life."

But the economics of this narrative are just about backward. The well-being of our children and grandchildren in 2023 or 2033 is not a function of how much debt reduction we target or enforce in this decade or how much we slash Social Security and Medicare but of whether we get economic growth back on track. Austerity is exactly the wrong way to restore growth.

If we cut deficits, decrease social spending, and tighten our belts, as the budget hawks recommend, the effect will be to reduce purchasing power in a fragile recovery. The case for deficit reduction rests on the premise that investors fear that deficits will increase inflation. But in a depressed economy, the problem is the opposite-deflation. The government is able to sell 30-year bonds for less than 3 percent interest. If investors were worried about inflation, nobody would take that risk. Despite conservative claims that cutting the deficit will "restore confidence," businessmen are not hesitating to invest because they're waiting for a deficit deal. They are hesitating because they don't see enough willing customers for the products.

If the government cuts the deficit in a still-weak recovery, it will condemn the economy to stagnant growth and flat or declining wages. That will indeed leave the next generation a lot poorer. The existing debt will loom larger relative to the size of the economy, and there will be too few public funds to invest in the education, employment, job training, and research outlays that our children and grandchildren need. It's not as if the budget hawks are proposing a dollar-for-dollar shift of Social Security and Medicare funds into social investment that serves the young.

There's an even more basic fallacy in the generational-justice story. In reality, non-rich young people and non-rich elderly are common victims. The same trends that have been devastating for young adults have been harmful for the elderly as well. Both groups have suffered from what Yale political scientist Jacob Hacker calls "the great risk-shift," though in different ways. 

The postwar system of traditional "defined benefit" pension plans organized and guaranteed by employers has moved inexorably in the direction of 401(k) plans and other savings schemes that are not pensions at all. In the early 1980s, nearly 60 percent of all American workers had traditional pension plans that guaranteed them a fixed monthly pension check until they died. The more generous plans paid health and pension benefits to spouses as well, and funding them was the responsibility of the employer. By contrast, 401(k) plans shift most of the costs and all of the risks to the retiree. A 401(k) plan is simply a pot of tax-deferred savings. When the money runs out, it's gone.

Work by Alicia Munnell, former vice president for research of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston who heads the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College's business school, has demonstrated that the funds in 401(k) plans are pitifully inadequate. The typical worker on the verge of retirement (age 55 to 64) has just $42,000 in his or her 401(k). If you convert that sum into an annuity, which guarantees a monthly payment as long as you live, it produces about $2,000 a year. The average Social Security benefit is just over $14,000 a year. Try living on $16,000 a year as a retired person.

Meanwhile, the percentage of private-sector workers covered by traditional pension plans declined from 62 percent in 1975 to 7 percent by 2009, according to the Employee Benefits Research Institute. Furthermore, many of these plans are underfunded, because employers tend to overstate the projected rate of return on fund assets in order to reduce the current contributions they have to make. Both public-employee and corporate plans have been cutting benefits. Virtually no newly created corporations since the early 1980s offer defined-benefit pension plans. The remaining traditional plans are the natural targets of corporate raiders like Bain Capital, which take operating companies into bankruptcy, where they can strip their pension plans. Almost every major airline has used this device to cut its pension obligations.

Most public workers still have traditional pension plans, but these are increasingly vulnerable fiscally and politically. Republican governors and mayors have used the budget crisis as a pretext for going after public-employee pension benefits, even though many state and local workers have paid into these plans, often as a trade-off for wages. Many public-sector workers, moreover, are not covered by Social Security. But as private-sector employees have lost benefits, the politics of protecting good pensions has turned against government workers. At a time when private-sector workers have been suffering high unemployment and declining wages, many look askance at the public employee's decent pension and health benefits. Rather than concluding, "I want what she has," the citizen is more likely to decide that the public worker has it too good. Public pension plans have also been underfunded, casualties of tax and budget assaults against state and local government and the general economic downturn.

The elderly have been clobbered by recent trends in three other respects. The lingering effects of the financial collapse have led the Federal Reserve to keep reducing interest rates, in the hope of levitating the economy. The medicine has kept the economy from sinking even further into depression. However, the flip side of Fed Chair Ben Bernanke's low interest rates is low earnings on savings for those on fixed incomes. Rates paid by certificates of deposit and money-market mutual funds are around 1 percent or 2 percent. If you want to invest in a Treasury bond, you might get 2.5 percent. Elderly people who counted on decent yields from their savings are out of luck.

Stocks may or may not pay higher returns, but they are classically investments "for the long run." The market delivers reliable returns over a span of two or three decades; however, most retired people won't live two or three decades. Any competent investment adviser will counsel a person over 65 that his or her investment portfolio should be mostly in bonds or cash savings. In this economy, that also means pitifully low returns.

The other prime asset held by the elderly is home equity. But the same financial collapse that led the Fed to turn to record-low interest rates was devastating to home equity. The crash reduced home equity by about $9 trillion, and most of those losses hit ordinary homeowners who never used subprime loans; they were innocent bystanders. When times were good, a senior citizen approaching age 70 might choose to downsize by selling the family home, moving to smaller quarters, and putting the proceeds into a nest egg that could earn a decent return. Now, the same retiree has much depleted capital assets, and the return on them is pitiful.

Although Medicare is blamed for consuming too many resources, that's mainly the result of the inefficient larger health system in which it resides. America's largely private system looks for profit centers, not for the most cost-effective care and prevention. Medicare, keep in mind, merely pays bills; the rest of the system is largely commercial. While Medicare's costs are rising to the taxpayer, from the perspective of a senior citizen, the program covers a diminishing percentage of doctor and hospital bills. Decent private "medi-gap" insurance that covers what Medicare doesn't costs upward of $2,000 a year. In addition, Medicare premiums keep increasing; Social Security is adjusted for inflation, but in recent years all of those adjustments and more have gone to pay for those rising Medicare costs.

In the high-unemployment economy since the economic collapse of 2008, the percentage of people in the labor force has declined for all age groups with one notable exception. People over age 65, and to an even greater extent over age 72, are increasing their employment, because they can't afford to retire.

Thus the "greedy geezer" 2012 model.

According to its most recent filings with the Internal Revenue Service, the Peter G. Peterson Foundation has spent just under half a billion dollars to persuade the young that they can't trust that Social Security will be there for them; that the debts run up by their elders are depriving them of a future; that money spent on the old diverts money spent on the young; and that the single most important public-policy challenge is to reduce the federal deficit, with cuts in Social Security benefits as the centerpiece.

Democrats have protected Social Security so far, but it was President Obama who appointed the Bowles-Simpson Commission. Obama continues to be heavily influenced by the claim of the commission, Peterson, and the media amen-chorus that the United States needs a grand bargain of deficit reduction that includes Social Security and Medicare cuts. Obama came perilously close to embracing this approach in the 2011 budget negotiations and was saved from himself only by the Republican refusal to entertain a nickel of tax increases on anyone. What Democrats have a hard time saying is that cuts in Social Security are not only unjust but unnecessary. According to the 2012 report of the Social Security Trustees, the system's long-term deficit is about 1 percent of gross domestic product. The slight worsening of Social Security's projected finances is entirely the result of high unemployment and the deterioration of workers' incomes. If wages rose with productivity, as they did in the postwar era and briefly in the late 1990s, Social Security would be solvent forever.

In the next Congress, the economy is at risk of a deeper slump caused by premature deficit reduction and needless cuts in Social Security and Medicare. We may be craving a new bipartisanship, but not this brand. The claims of generational warfare and the need for an austerity cure are built on factual fallacies and dubious economics. Despite the pamphleteering of the Peterson Foundation et al., the best way to make sense of the widening schisms in this economy is not old versus young. It is top 1 percent versus everyone else." 

Sunday, December 2, 2012

CBS News: Steve Croft: Hospitals: The Cost of Admission

Source:CBS News 60 Minutes with a piece about for-profit hospitals in America.

"Steve Kroft investigates allegations from doctors that the hospital chain they worked for pressured them to admit patients regardless of their medical needs." 

From CBS News

This sounds like one of those stories about for-profit, private prisons in America that have been making the news the last couple of years, because states have been looking for ways to cut costs in their state budgets. 

Whether hospitals are for-profit or not, the point of hospitals is to serve people who are injured and are sick. They are not banks looking to make as much money as possible. At least they're not supposed to be. Housing people in hospitals, simply to make more money, just drives up the health care costs for everyone else and it should be illegal.